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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterrence

Foreign Affairs
美國外交事務期刊

Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence
台灣與威懾力的真正來源

Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China
為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅只是對其發出威脅？

By Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen
November 30, 2023
作者：Bonnie S. Glaser、Jessica Chen Weiss和 Thomas J. Christensen
2023年11月30日

The growing might of China’s military and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan have made deterrence in the Taiwan Strait a tougher challenge than ever before. It is incumbent on the United States to support Taiwan’s efforts to develop a defensive “porcupine strategy.” Washington can help Taiwan’s military stockpile and train with coastal defense and air defense weapons, field a robust civil defense force, and create strategic reserves of critical materials such as food and fuel to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion or blockade of the island. The U.S. military should also better prepare to cope with China’s expanding arsenal of missiles that pose a threat to U.S. regional bases and even aircraft carriers by creating a stronger, more agile, and more geographically dispersed military presence in the region.
隨著中國軍力的不斷增長，及其對台灣日益咄咄逼人的姿態，使台灣海峽的威懾成為前所未有的嚴峻挑戰。美國有責任支持台灣發展防禦性 「豪豬戰略」的努力。美國政府可以幫助台灣軍方儲備和訓練海岸防禦和防空武器，並協助其組建強大的民防部隊，以及建立糧食和燃料等關鍵物資的戰略儲備，以威懾中國並在必要時擊退其對台灣島的入侵或封鎖。基於中國不斷擴大的導彈武器庫對美國的海外基地甚至於航空母艦都構成了威脅，美國軍方也應在亞太地區建立更強大、更靈活、地理位置更分散的軍事力量，以對中國的導彈威脅做更充分的準備。

But deterrence is not just a matter of weapons in arsenals, boots on the ground, planes in the air, ships at sea, or strategies on the planning table. Signaling a credible military threat is only part of a successful strategy of deterrence. It also takes assurances to keep potential adversaries at bay. A threatened state has little incentive to avoid war if it fears the unacceptable consequences of not fighting. As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling wrote years ago, “‘One more step and I shoot’ can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop, I won’t.’”
但是，威懾力並不僅僅在於武器庫裡有多少庫存、地面部隊有多少、戰機有幾架、軍艦有幾艘、或策劃了多種不同的戰略。發出可信的軍事威脅訊號只是成功威懾戰略的一部分，還需要讓潛在對手不會輕舉妄動的保證。受到威脅的國家如果認為避戰會帶來不可接受的後果，對他們而言就沒有驅動力去避免戰爭的發生。正如同諾貝爾經濟學獎得主Thomas Schelling多年前寫的：「『你再靠近一步我就開槍』這句話的威嚇力，只有伴隨著『如果你不再靠近，那我就不會開槍』的承諾，才能成為可信的威脅」。

In truth, the more powerful and credible one’s threat of military action, the more important and the more difficult it is to credibly assure the potential adversary. The three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait are not providing one another with sufficient assurances. For example, to enhance deterrence, Washington must make clear that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo, not only an attempt by Beijing to compel unification but also a political move by Taipei to pursue independence. And as the United States works with Taiwan to strengthen its security, it must avoid giving the impression that it is moving toward restoring formal diplomatic relations or a defense alliance with the island. Combined with a conditional and credible threat of a military response by the United States and Taiwan to the use of force, such assurances will help prevent a war.
事實上，一個國家的軍事行動威脅越強大，向潛在對手做出可信的承諾就越重要，但也越困難。可惜的是，台灣海峽情勢中的三方都沒有向彼此提供足夠的承諾。比方說，為了增強其威懾力，美國政府必須明確表示反對任何單方面改變現狀的行為，而這並不僅僅包含北京（中國政府）強迫統一的企圖，也包括台北（台灣政府）走向獨立的政治盤算。在美國幫助加強台灣防衛的同時，也必須避免給人留下（美國）正在恢復與台灣的正式外交關係或建立防衛聯盟的印象。美國和台灣對入侵武力具備做出軍事回應的力量，再加上保證不會單方面改變現狀，這將有助於防止台海戰爭的發生。

Ill-advised statements made in the past by former and current U.S. officials suggesting that the United States should formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state or restore a clear alliance commitment to defend the island would, if adopted, undercut assurances and weaken deterrence as surely as would a lack of military readiness. U.S. military threats will lose their potency if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence or to prevent unification under any circumstances, even if it were to result from peaceful, uncoerced negotiation. Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification or would allow the United States to restore something akin to a defense alliance with Taiwan. And if China comes to that conclusion, then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.
美國前任和現任官員過去曾發表不明智的言論，建議美國應正式承認台灣為主權國家，或恢復保衛台灣的明確聯盟承諾；如果這些官員的言論被採納，將會削弱美國不製造衝突的承諾並弱化其威懾力，這跟欠缺軍事準備沒有兩樣。如果中國領導人相信美國會利用中國不犯台的自我克制來促進台灣的正式獨立，或在任何情況下阻止台灣的統一，即使被阻止的統一進程是（北京台北雙方）透過和平、無脅迫的談判達成，那麼美國在亞太的軍事威脅也將失去效力。北京可能會認定如果他們不主動發動攻擊，意味著他們將永遠失去統一台灣的可能性，或者將會放任美國恢復與台灣的防衛聯盟。如果中國得出這樣的結論，那麼華盛頓在就算在亞太地區重點加強軍事力量，也可能無法阻止戰爭的發生。

DAMNED IF THEY DO, DAMNED IF THEY DON’T
不管做不做，都會受到懲罰

Although the logic of deterrence through brute strength is intuitively appealing, both theory and history show that the threat of punishment fails to deter if it is not paired with assurances that those same military capabilities will not be used to in some way hurt the other side. “The purpose of combining conditional assurances with conditional threats,” the political scientist Reid Pauly has noted, is to “present a choice; one that does not lead the target to believe they are ‘damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.’”
儘管通過蠻力進行威懾的邏輯直觀上很吸引人，但理論和歷史都表明，如果不同時保證這些軍事能力不會被刻意用來傷害對方，那麼這種軍事威脅力就也產生不起威懾作用。政治學家裡Reid Pauly就曾指出：「將有條件的承諾與有條件的威脅結合起來的目的，是為了提出一種選擇；一種不會讓對方認為他們『不管做不做，都會受到懲罰』的選擇」。

For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible. As the scholars Matthew Cebul, Allan Dafoe, and Nuno Monteiro have noted, “Power boosts the credibility of threats but undermines that of assurances.” This dynamic is what political scientists have long described as the security dilemma. To issue credible threats and assurances simultaneously, leaders must cultivate “a reputation for restraint in the face of compliance” rather than simply a reputation for unconditionally inflicting punishment. And it is precisely because the United States should bolster and diversify its military presence in the region and help strengthen Taiwan’s defenses that it must also provide clearer and more persistently conveyed assurances.
為了有效威懾對方，向對方做出的威脅和承諾兩者都必須可信。正如Matthew Cebul、Allan Dafoe和Nuno Monteiro這幾位學者說的：「力量會提高威脅的可信度，但會削弱承諾的可信度」。而這正是政治科學家們長期以來所描述的安全困境。如果要同時做出可信的威脅和承諾，領導人就必須保持「當對手克制時自己也要保持克制的聲譽」，而不是給對方不管他們怎麼做都會受到懲罰的印象。正因為美國應加強及多樣化在亞太地區的軍事力量以幫助台灣加強防禦，所以它也必須向北京當局提供更明確、更持久的承諾。

Beijing, Taipei, and Washington are all focused on demonstrating resolve and building convincing wartime capabilities to signal their preparedness and willingness to use force. Beijing hopes to prevent Taiwan from further consolidating its separation from the mainland, while Taipei and Washington hope to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan to force unification. Yet all three parties have neglected corresponding efforts to signal to one another that these military preparations are not meant to alter the status quo or to preclude the prospect of an eventual peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. To be sure, leaders on all sides have, to some extent, continued to offer assurances to one another. Senior Biden administration officials have reaffirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence; Chinese leaders have reiterated that “peaceful reunification” remains their preferred option (although they tend to regard coercive efforts, short of war, as still peaceful); and leaders in Taipei have refrained from pushing for formal independence. Unfortunately, officials in all three capitals have also expanded the scope of what they believe are legitimate measures to signal resolve in response to perceived threats, fueling a potentially dangerous spiral of actions and reactions. Beijing, Taipei, and Washington have not reiterated key statements that once made an eventual peaceful resolution at least conceivable. Such assurances were never meant to promote a near-term resolution or to specify the details of any eventual resolution; they were meant to convey that there still might be peaceful ways of settling cross-strait differences.
無論是北京、台北或是華盛頓當局，三方都專注於展示其面對戰爭的決心以及建立令人信服的戰力，以表明他們已經做好了使用武力的準備和意願。北京當局希望能阻止台灣進一步脫離中國大陸，而台北和華盛頓則希望阻止北京進犯台灣以武力逼迫統一。然而，這三方都忽視了向對方發出降低衝突的相應訊號的努力，都缺乏向對方保證己方做的軍事準備並不是為了改變現狀，或為了排除最終和平解決兩岸分歧的前景。可以肯定的是，各方領導人在一定程度上都在持續表達己方立場。拜登政府高級官員重申美國不支持台灣獨立；中國領導人重申「和平統一」仍是他們的首選（儘管他們傾向於認為只要沒有開戰，用恐嚇威脅對方就範依舊是和平的）；台北領導人則避免推動正式獨立。不幸的是，這三個國家的官員為表明他們應對威脅的決心，各自都擴大了他們認為合法的措施的範圍。而這種行為正助長了潛在的軍事對抗行動的危險循環。北京、台北和華盛頓都沒有重申以前曾經讓和平解決兩案問題存在可能性的關鍵聲明。過去這三方做出的這些聲明從來都不是為了提供兩岸問題的短期獲長期的解決方案，而是向各方傳達仍有可能以和平方式解決兩岸分歧的觀點。

For instance, Beijing’s proposals regarding the governance of a future Taiwan unified with the mainland have grown less generous over time. The “one country, two systems” offer that Beijing made in a 1993 white paper included allowing the island to “have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary, and the right of adjudication” as well as “its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs,” and a pledge that Beijing would not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. The former assurance disappeared in China’s 2000 white paper on the topic, and the latter was removed in its 2022 iteration. “One country, two systems” was never a popular concept in Taiwan, and it has become even less so now that Beijing has tightened its hold on Hong Kong, where it had pioneered the approach. Combined with increasingly aggressive and frequent Chinese military operations near Taiwan, the failure to offer more attractive options for Taiwan’s future only makes Beijing seem both more threatening and less trustworthy.
舉例來說，隨著時間的推移，中國政府關於未來兩岸統一後給予台灣地區的自治權已經越來越縮緊。北京在1993年白皮書中提出的 「一國兩制」方案包括允許台灣「擁有自己的行政立法權、獨立的司法權和審判權」，以及「自己的政黨、政治、軍事、經濟和金融事務」，並保證北京不會派遣軍隊或行政人員駐紮在台灣。前一項承諾在中國2000年的相關白皮書中消失了，後一項則在2022年的白皮書中被刪除。在台灣，「一國兩制」從來都不是一個受歡迎的概念，如今隨著北京收緊了對香港的控制，這一概念就變得更加不受歡迎了，而香港正是中國「一國兩制」的先驅。再加上中國在台灣附近的軍事行動日益激進和頻繁，無法替台灣的未來提供更具吸引力的選擇只會讓北京顯得更具威脅性和更不值得信任。

As for Taiwan, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has a long tradition of supporting independence, but since 1999 it has ceased calling for the creation of a Republic of Taiwan and instead maintains that Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China, is already an independent sovereign state. The current DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, has refrained from seeking formal independence and has sought to alleviate Beijing’s worst fears, adhering to her 2016 pledge to act in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution, which defines China as including both sides of the strait. At the same time, she has refused to accept the “1992 Consensus,” an alleged understanding between representatives of Beijing and the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party) that mainland China and Taiwan belong to one and the same country even as they disagreed about whether that country was the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China.
至於台灣方面，執政的民進黨有著支持台灣獨立的悠久傳統，但自1999年以來，該黨已不再呼籲建立台灣共和國，而是堅持認為台灣（正式名稱為中華民國）已經是一個獨立的主權國家。現任民進黨主席蔡英文並沒有謀求正式獨立，而是盡力在減輕北京的擔心和疑慮，並恪守她在2016年做出的按照中華民國憲法行事的承諾—該憲法將中國定義為包括海峽兩岸。與此同時，她拒絕接受 「九二共識」。「九二共識」據稱是北京和國民黨（中國國民黨）代表之間達成的共識，即中國大陸和台灣屬於同一個國家，即便他們在這個國家是中華民國還是中華人民共和國的問題上仍然存在分歧。

DPP members and many scholars dispute that such a consensus ever existed. Still, Beijing accuses Tsai of altering the status quo by failing to accept the 1992 consensus, which her rivals in the KMT continue to endorse. And although she has resisted pressure from radicals in her own party to pursue measures that would likely be interpreted in Beijing as moves in the direction of independence—such as ceasing to use the Republic of China national anthem or insisting on the use of the moniker “Taiwan” rather than “Chinese Taipei” at international sporting events—Tsai has allowed the teaching of Taiwan’s history separate from the history of China in high schools.
民進黨成員和許多學者都對「九二共識」的存在提出了質疑。儘管如此，北京仍然指責蔡英文不接受九二共識，從而單方面改變了現狀，而她的國民黨競爭對手則繼續支持九二共識。儘管蔡英文壓制了來自黨內激進份子的壓力，避免這些激進份子推動那些可能會被北京解讀為走向獨立的政策：比方說廢除中華民國國歌，或堅持在國際體育賽事中使用被稱做 「台灣」而非 「中華台北」。但蔡英文至少仍然允許在高中歷史課將台灣歷史與中國歷史分開教授。

And questions remain about the sustainability of Taiwan’s restraint in the future. The current DPP vice president and front-runner in the presidential election scheduled for January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te, has in the past advocated for independence more stridently than Tsai, describing himself in 2017 as a “political worker for Taiwan independence.” More recently in July 2023, Lai told supporters at a campaign event that his party’s ambition is to have a sitting president of Taiwan “enter the White House,” which implies his goal is to upgrade Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, raising alarm in Beijing and prompting a request for clarification from Washington.
台灣未來能否繼續保持克制仍是個問題。現任民進黨副主席、即將在2024年1月13日舉行的總統選舉的民調領先者賴清德過去曾比蔡英文更強烈地主張台灣獨立，他在2017年將自己描述為「台獨工作者」。而在2023年7月，賴清德在一次競選活動中對支持者說，他的政黨的雄心壯志是讓台灣現任總統 「走入白宮」，這意味著他的目標是升級美台關係，這引起了北京方面的警覺，並依此要求美國做出澄清。

As for the United States, the Biden administration has regularly reiterated that it “does not support Taiwan independence” and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. These statements are consistent with the traditional U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in which the United States avoids specifying under what conditions it would intervene in a cross-strait conflict and thereby does not give a green light to independence advocates in Taiwan or provoke Beijing by appearing to restore the U.S. alliance commitment to Taiwan. But the credibility of those statements has been called into question by Biden’s repeated insistence that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked because it made a commitment to do so, even though the United States has not had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan since it abrogated the alliance with Taipei in 1979 as a precondition to normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Biden administration officials have also noticeably failed to confirm that the United States would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences achieved through negotiations and without coercion. The Biden administration’s omission of this assurance has increased Beijing’s suspicions that Washington would never accept any form of cross-strait integration, even if achieved through nonviolent means. So have statements by Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific affairs, that Taiwan is “located at a critical node within the First Island Chain” in the Western Pacific, implying that the island is strategically indispensable to the defense of U.S. allies and thus no form of unification would be acceptable to the United States.
至於美國方面，拜登政府經常重申他們「不支持台灣獨立」，並反對海峽兩岸任何一方單方面改變現狀。這些聲明符合美國傳統的「戰略模糊」政策，即美國避免具體說明在何種情況下會介入兩岸衝突，以避免大開綠燈給台獨分子撿到槍，也不會因看似要恢復美國對台灣的同盟承諾的行為而激怒北京。但美國戰略模糊政策的可信度因為拜登的聲明而一再受到質疑；拜登多次堅稱，如果台灣受到攻擊那美國將會保護台灣，因為美國曾經做出這樣的承諾；儘管美國自1979年廢除與台北當局的同盟關係以作為與北京實現外交關係正常化的先決條件以來，美國從來就沒有保護台灣的正式義務。拜登政府的官員也沒有明確表示過美國將接受任何通過談判、沒有脅迫的情況下和平解決兩岸分歧的方案，這種疏漏顯然增加了北京的疑慮，讓北京當局懷疑華盛頓是否不會接受任何形式的兩岸統一方案，就算是非暴力的統一方式。印度太平洋安全事務助理國防部長Ely Ratner也曾表示台灣 「位於西太平洋第一島鏈的關鍵節點」，這暗示著台灣島對美國防衛其盟友的戰略價值是不可或缺的，因此美國不會接受任何形式的統一。

Chinese officials no doubt perceive Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan and pursue a stronger military posture in the region as a serious demonstration of resolve. But U.S. actions, paired with the rhetoric of American officials, have also raised fears in Beijing that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi charged at a press conference in August 2022, and to restore something akin to the alliance that existed with Taipei before 1979. Some analysts in Beijing fear that recent U.S. attempts to reopen high-level diplomatic channels with Beijing merely mask continued efforts to weaken China and prevent even peaceful unification from ever occurring. Such fears are exacerbated by statements by members of the U.S. Congress, former senior officials, and leading scholars who call for everything from restoring official relations with Taiwan to resurrecting the U.S. alliance with it to stationing large numbers of U.S. forces on the island.
毫無疑問，中國官員認為華盛頓加強與台灣關係的努力以及在該地區追求更強大的軍事態勢是一種嚴肅的決心展示。但美國的行動和美國官員的言論也更強化了北京的擔憂，即美國試圖「利用台灣遏制中國」。如同中國國務委員兼外交部長王毅在2022年8月的記者招待會上所指責的那樣，美國試圖恢復類似於1979年之前與台北的同盟關係。北京的一些分析家擔心，美國最近試圖重開與北京的高層外交管道，只是掩蓋了美國繼續削弱中國、甚至阻止中國實現和平統一的企圖。數名美國國會議員、前高級官員以及知名學者的言論都更加劇了北京的擔憂，那些人呼籲美國政府恢復與台灣的官方關係、同盟關係、以及在台灣島上駐紮大量美軍。

DOUBTS AND FEARS IN THE STRAIT
籠罩台灣海峽的疑慮和恐懼

To shore up peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, all sides must recognize that credible assurance is essential for effective deterrence. Credible assurance is not a reward or a carrot. It is a guarantee that a threat is fully conditional on the behavior of its target. Such assurances are not the same as trust-building measures, which are incremental compromises made in a gradual and reciprocal manner. By contrast, an assurance does not have to be reciprocated, as it is not a concession or an effort to build trust. It can and should be made unilaterally to strengthen deterrence, as long as it does not weaken the credibility or capacity to respond to perceived threats. On its own, a credible assurance would strengthen deterrence. If reciprocated, it could, over time, build trust among the parties and reduce tensions.
為了維護台灣海峽的和平與穩定，各方都必須認識到可信的承諾對於有效的威懾至關重要。可信的承諾並不單純只是獎勵或是什麼胡蘿蔔，它是一種保證，保證戰爭的威脅完全取決於對方的行為而不在於己方。這種承諾與建立信任措施不同，後者是以漸進和互惠的方式做出的漸進妥協。相比之下，承諾不一定要得到回應，因為它不是讓步，也不是向對方建立信任的努力。它可以而且必須要由單方面做出，以加強威懾力的可靠度，只要它不會削弱應對所知威脅的可信度或能力。可信的承諾本身就能加強威懾力。如果得到回應，隨著時間的推移，還可以在雙方之間建立信任，緩解緊張局勢。

Beijing has long threatened to adopt “nonpeaceful” means if Taipei appears to be pursuing permanent separation or formal independence. But the Chinese military buildup and intense military drills near Taiwan have fueled fears that Beijing is shifting from a policy of deterring any pursuit of independence by Taiwan to compelling unification through coercion or military force. As these doubts and suspicions multiply, all sides will lose the incentive to avoid provocative moves. When Beijing fails to reassure Taipei that its military preparations are not a harbinger of a coming attack, it undercuts incentives for people in Taiwan to support moderation by its political leaders. The lack of credible Chinese assurances also strengthens the hand of American politicians and commentators who want to scrap strategic ambiguity, upgrade ties with Taiwan from unofficial to official relations, and restore defense commitments to the island akin to those that obtained before 1979.
北京長期以來一直威脅說如果台北打算尋求永久與大陸分離或正式獨立，它將採取 「非和平」手段。但中國在台灣附近的軍事集結和密集的軍事演習加劇了人們的擔憂，即中國政府正在從阻止台灣追求獨立的政策轉向通過脅迫或軍事力量迫使台灣統一。隨著這些疑慮和猜測的增加，各方都將失去避免挑釁行動的嚇阻力。如果北京不能向台北保證其軍事準備並非即將發動攻擊的先兆，就會削弱台灣人民支持其政治領導人採取溫和態度的動力。部分美國政客和評論家希望消除戰略模糊性，將與台灣的關係從非官方關係提升為官方關係，並恢復與 1979 年之前類似的對台灣的防務承諾，而中國缺乏可信的承諾也會加強他們的這種想法。

To strengthen the credibility of Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful process, China should dial back its military operations near Taiwan. Having used such operations to register displeasure with U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, Chinese air and naval exercises should be reset to the two-decade practice of tacitly observing the Taiwan Strait centerline. Beijing also codified into a 2005 law its right to use force against Taiwan if it perceives that peaceful unification is no longer possible. The vague conditions and implied impatience of such a threat have failed to convince people in Taiwan that the island will not be attacked as long as they do not attempt to permanently separate from China. Without such an assurance, Taipei has less reason to refrain from pursuing unilateral changes in the status quo. China should revise this language to incorporate the assurance that as long as Taiwan does not pursue formal independence, Beijing will not use force. If Beijing’s leaders truly prefer peaceful unification with Taiwan, as they continue to claim, they should keep the door open to precisely that outcome.
為加強北京和平處理台海問題承諾的可信度，中國應減少在台灣附近的軍事行動。2022年8月，美國眾議院議長Nancy Pelosi訪問台灣，作為回應，中國利用軍事演習行動表達了他們的不滿。（為避免局勢繼續升溫）中國的空軍和海軍演習應恢復到默許觀察台灣海峽中線的二十年慣例。北京在2005年的反分裂國家法規定說，如果它認為和平統一不再可能，就有權對台灣動武。這種威脅的模糊條件和隱含的不耐煩心態，反而未能說服台灣人民只要台灣不試圖永久脫離中國，那中國就不會武力入侵台灣。中國未能提出和平的承諾，台北就更沒有理由不單方面改變現狀。中國應修改這一措辭，加入只要台灣不尋求正式獨立，北京就不會使用武力的承諾。如果北京領導人真的像他們繼續聲稱的那樣希望與台灣和平統一，他們就應該為這一結果敞開大門。

For its part, Taiwan must accompany needed measures to bolster its defense with credible assurances to Beijing that as long as the Chinese military refrains from attacking Taiwan, Taipei will not pursue independence or permanent separation. Taiwan should refrain from potentially provocative actions, such as holding a referendum to change its official name, the Republic of China, or revising its territorial claims to exclude mainland China—changes that would indicate a declaration of formal independence. Regardless of who is elected Taiwan’s next president, Taipei will need to convincingly reassure Beijing that it has no intention of fundamentally altering the status quo. But the need for such guarantees will grow in the event of the victory of Lai, the DPP candidate; Chinese officials deeply mistrust him since he has endorsed the pursuit of formal independence for Taiwan in the past. The pledge that Lai made, in an October 2023 speech in Taipei at a dinner attended by nearly 100 foreign dignitaries and guests, to maintain Tsai’s cross-strait policy, with its emphasis on refusing both to bow to Chinese pressure and to provoke Beijing, is a good start. If elected, Lai could use his inaugural address to reaffirm the commitments Tsai made in her inaugural speech in 2016 to conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution and the 1992 act governing relations between the two sides of the strait, Taipei’s law on how the island should manage relations with Beijing.
而對台灣而言，在採取必要措施加強防禦的同時，還必須向北京做出可信的承諾，只要中國軍隊不對台灣發動攻擊，就不會追求獨立或永久與中國大陸分離。台灣應避免採取潛在的挑釁行動，比方說舉行全民公決以更改其正式名稱「中華民國」，或修改其（憲法中的）領土範圍主張以將中國大陸排除在外—這些改變都將表明台灣宣佈正式獨立。不管誰當選台灣下一任總統，台北都需要向中方消除改變現狀的疑慮。但如果民進黨候選人賴清德獲勝，北京對此類承諾的需求將會增加；中國官員對他非常不信任，因為賴清德過去曾支持台灣尋求正式獨立。賴清德於2023年10月在台北的一次有近百名外國政要和嘉賓出席的晚宴上發表演講，承諾維持蔡英文的兩岸政策，強調既不屈服於中國的壓力，也不挑釁北京，這是一個良好的開端。如果當選，賴清德可以在就職演說中重申蔡英文在2016年就職演說中做出的承諾，即按照中華民國憲法和1992年兩岸關係法（台北關於島內應如何處理與北京關係的法律）處理兩岸事務。

As Taiwan strengthens its military deterrent—including by increasing its ability to withstand a blockade and to defeat an invading Chinese force—it must also implement additional measures to reinforce the credibility of its assurances. In August, Lai took a step in the right direction when he made his stance on the naming question clear: “President Tsai has used the term Republic of China (Taiwan) to describe our country. I will continue to do so in the future.” This and other statements provide China with rhetorical assurance, but because his party’s 1991 charter still calls for the creation of a “Republic of Taiwan” and a new constitution, doubts persist in Beijing about his willingness to hold to this position as president. If he wins the election, Lai should consider revisiting a proposal made by DPP legislators in 2014 to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter, a nonbinding and reversible step that would give any rhetorical commitment to the status quo more weight and credibility. Such a step could also be part of a gradual, reciprocal process to reduce tensions and build trust, as advocated by Richard Bush, the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan.
隨著台灣加強其軍事威懾力，包括提高其抵禦封鎖和擊敗入侵中國軍隊的能力，它還必須採取更多措施來加強其承諾的可信度。今年8月，賴清德在國家名稱問題上表明了自己的立場，朝著正確的方向邁出了一步：「蔡英文總統曾使用中華民國（台灣）來描述我們的國家。今後我將繼續這樣做」。這番話和其他聲明為中國提供了言辭上的保證，但由於賴清德所屬的民進黨的1991年黨綱仍呼籲建立「台灣共和國」和制定新憲法，北京方面對他是否願意堅持（蔡英文）總統路線仍心存疑慮。如果賴清德贏得選舉，他應該考慮重新審視民進黨立法委員在2014年提出的凍結1991年台獨黨綱提案，這一不具約束力且可逆的步驟將讓任何維持現狀的口頭承諾賦予更多分量和可信度。正如美國在台協會（American Institute in Taiwan）前主席Richard Bush所主張的那樣，這一步驟也可以成為緩解緊張局勢和建立信任的漸進、互惠過程的一部分。

Just as the United States must not rule out the possibility of an eventual peaceful integration of the two sides of the strait (as long as such a move has the assent of the people of Taiwan), Taipei should also not take actions that would permanently foreclose that outcome. To deter war, Taiwan must allow leaders in Beijing to believe that peaceful unification remains possible.
正如美國決不能排除海峽兩岸最終和平統一的可能性一樣（只要此舉得到台灣人民的同意），台北當局也不應該採取會永久阻止這一結果的行動。為了阻止戰爭，台灣必須讓北京領導人相信和平統一仍然是可能的。

DISCRETION AND DISCIPLINE
謹慎和紀律

As the third party to this dispute, the United States must also think carefully about its mix of threats and assurances. Its priority is to prevent the Chinese military from attacking Taiwan, but deterrence will not work if Beijing does not believe U.S. assurances. For instance, it is in the United States’ interest for China to remain hopeful that sometime in the future it might be able to resolve its differences with Taiwan without resorting to violence. China would have to persuade Taiwan’s public of the merits of some form of peaceful integration—a hard sell, but not impossible given China’s economic clout and the possibility that a more attractive government may someday emerge in Beijing. To the extent that Washington can influence Chinese President Xi Jinping’s thinking on this crucial issue, it should do so; the United States should avoid making statements or taking actions that could lead Beijing to conclude that unification can only be achieved through force.
作為爭端的第三方，美國還必須仔細考慮其威脅和承諾的比重。美國的首要任務是防止中國軍隊攻擊台灣，但如果北京不相信美國的承諾，威懾就不會奏效。比方說，美國希望中國在未來某個時候能夠不訴諸暴力解決與台灣的分歧，這符合美國的利益。中國必須說服台灣民眾相信某種形式的和平統一是有好處的—這很難做到，但鑑於中國日益增強的的經濟影響力，以及北京有朝一日可能會出現一個更具吸引力的政府，這並非不可能。只要華盛頓能影響中國國家主席習近平在這一關鍵問題上的想法，它就應該朝這方向努力；美國應避免發表任何可能導致中國政府得出只能透過武力實現統一的結論的言論。

Consistent with its “one China” policy of not supporting an independent Taiwan or seeking to restore a formal alliance with Taipei, the U.S. government should not use in its official communications symbols of Taiwan’s sovereignty, such as the flag of the Republic of China, or refer to Taiwan as either a country or an ally, as the Trump administration did in a 2019 Defense Department report. If U.S. officials do so inadvertently, such as when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Taiwan as a country on two occasions in 2021, a correction should be swiftly issued. An example of the laudable handling of such a blunder was the White House’s admission that it made an “honest mistake” after including the image of the Republic of China flag in a tweet about the United States supplying COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan that same year. And since Beijing fears that Taiwan may merely be a pawn in a wider American game of containment, U.S. officials should not imply that Taiwan is a strategic asset essential to U.S. national security.
美國政府的「一個中國」政策是不支持台灣獨立，也不尋求恢復與台北的正式同盟關係，根據這一政策，美國政府不應在官方交流中使用中華民國國旗等台灣主權象徵，也不應將台灣稱為國家或盟國。川普政府在國防部2019年的一份報告中就犯了這種錯誤。如果美國官員無意中這樣做了，比如美國國務卿Antony Blinken曾經錯誤地在2021年兩次將台灣稱為國家，則應迅速發佈更正。白宮在同年一條關於美國向台灣供應COVID-19疫苗的推文中加入了中華民國國旗的圖像，白宮立馬承認自己犯了「誠實的錯誤」，這就是處理此類失誤的一個值得稱許的例子。由於北京擔心台灣可能只是美國更廣泛的遏制中國戰略中的一枚棋子，美國官員不應暗示台灣是美國國家安全不可或缺的戰略資產。

The Biden administration insists that it has made no changes to the “one China” policy. But Biden’s remarks have repeatedly broken with strategic ambiguity and mischaracterized U.S. policy. During an August 2021 interview with ABC News, Biden stated, incorrectly, that the United States has a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, comparing the U.S. “sacred commitment” to the pledges it has made to Japan and South Korea. In the most egregious misstatement of U.S. policy on Taiwan to date, Biden told reporters in November 2021 that Taiwan “is independent” and “makes its own decisions,” a description that contravenes long-standing U.S. policy that does not recognize Taiwan as an independent, sovereign state.
拜登政府堅稱沒有改變「一個中國」的政策。但拜登的言論一再打破戰略模糊，並對美國政策進行錯誤描述。2021年8月，拜登在接受美國廣播公司ABC News採訪時，錯誤地表示美國有保衛台灣的條約承諾，並將美國的「神聖承諾」與美國對日本和韓國的承諾相提並論。拜登在2021年11月對記者說，台灣 「是獨立的」，「可以自己做決定」，這是迄今為止美國對台政策最嚴重的錯誤表述，違背了美國不承認台灣是獨立主權國家的長期政策。

These statements do far more to undermine deterrence than they do to bolster it. Beijing has long anticipated that Washington will intervene if China tries to force unification. The Taiwan Relations Act, a law Congress passed in 1979 to define the now informal relations between Washington and Taipei after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes,” would be considered a “threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The U.S. commitment to Taiwan does not need further clarification or beefing up, and certainly no U.S. official should invoke or even suggest anything akin to a restoration of a formal alliance. Such an unqualified commitment to Taiwan could be seen on both sides of the strait as a green light for more strident pro-independence voices in Taiwan to pursue a formal separation from China.
這些言論對威懾力的削弱遠大於對威懾力的增強。北京早已料到，如果中國試圖武力統一，華盛頓就會進行干預。1979年，美國國會通過了《台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act），在華盛頓與北京關係正常化之後，該法界定了華盛頓與台北之間持續到現在的非正式關係，其中規定，「任何以和平手段以外的方式來決定台灣未來的行動，包括抵制或禁運」都將被視為「對西太平洋地區和平與安全的威脅，並引起美國的嚴重關切」。美國對台灣的承諾不需要進一步澄清或加強，當然任何美國官員都不應該援引或甚至暗示任何類似於恢復正式同盟關係的言論。這類不合格的對台承諾可能會被海峽兩岸視為替激烈主張台獨的聲音開綠燈，以激勵台灣尋求正式脫離中國。

The U.S. government should provide a comprehensive and high-level statement laying out its “one China” policy and explaining why Taiwan matters to the United States in language that is comprehensible to the American people, beyond the rote repetition of the U.S. “one China” policy as comprising the Taiwan Relations Act; the three U.S.-China joint communiques in 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the Six Assurances that the Reagan administration gave to Taipei in 1982. A more complete statement, such as a speech by the national security adviser or the secretary of state, should restate the positions that Biden has reportedly made clear to Xi, including that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, does not pursue a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy, and does not seek to use Taiwan as part of a strategy to contain China or embolden Taipei to push for independence. Such a statement should include the assurance provided by prior administrations that the United States will accept any outcome reached peacefully by both sides and that has the assent of the people of Taiwan.
美國政府應該提供一份全面性的高層聲明，明白闡述其「一個中國」政策，並以美國人民能夠理解的語言解釋為什麼台灣對美國很重要，而不只是死板地重複美國的「一個中國」政策，或是重複包括《台灣關係法》、1972年、1979年和1982年的三份美中聯合公報、以及1982年雷根政府給台北當局的六項保證。（美國政府應該公佈）一份更完整的聲明，比方說國家安全顧問或國務卿的官方演說，重申依據拜習會的報導中拜登已向習近平表明的立場，包括美國不支持台灣獨立，反對任何一方單方面改變現狀，不奉行「兩個中國」或「一中一台」政策，也不尋求利用台灣作為遏制中國戰略的一部分，或給台獨人士遞刀子。這一聲明應包括前幾屆政府提供的保證，即美國將接受雙方和平達成並得到台灣人民同意的任何結果。

Until recently, no Biden administration official had publicly called for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and manage problems, a position that was central to U.S. policy before the Trump administration. It is welcome that American Institute in Taiwan Chair Laura Rosenberger, in a roundtable with the media in Taipei in October 2023, said that the United States supports cross-strait dialogue and called on Beijing to start a dialogue with Taiwan. Even though Beijing is responsible for the breakdown of cross-strait dialogue, the failure of the United States to encourage a return to talks has been interpreted by Beijing as further evidence that Washington does not want the two sides of the strait to settle their disputes. If Beijing believes that Washington does not truly want cross-strait tensions to be resolved, it will be much harder for the United States to deter an attack on Taiwan.
直到最近，拜登政府官員都沒有公開呼籲恢復兩岸對話，以減少誤解和管理問題，而（不鼓勵兩岸對話）正是川普政府時代美國政策的核心立場。可喜的是，美國在台協會主席羅森伯格（Laura Rosenberger）於2023年10月在台北與開記者會時對媒體表示，美國支持兩岸對話，並呼籲北京與台灣展開對話。儘管北京對兩岸對話的破裂負有責任，但之前美國未能鼓勵兩岸恢復對話，已經被北京解讀為華盛頓不希望兩岸解決爭端的進一步證據。如果北京認為華盛頓並不真正希望解決兩岸緊張局勢，那麼美國將更難阻止中國武統台灣。

U.S. officials should also work to ensure that Taiwan does not upset the status quo. Taiwan has laudably begun to strengthen its defenses under Tsai, but her administration has also tactfully refrained from pushing pro-independence initiatives. That marks a departure from her DPP predecessor as president, Chen Shui-bian, who held a referendum in 2008 on pursuing membership in the United Nations under the name Taiwan, rather than the Republic of China, which was rightly interpreted by both Beijing and Washington as a ploy to promote independence. Since the UN is an international institution for which statehood is a requirement for membership, to apply under the name Taiwan instead of the Republic of China would assert the full sovereign separation of the island. If a future government of Taiwan or key political figures appear to be promoting such a change in the status quo, U.S. officials should voice concerns in private, in public, or both. The United States should never coordinate its Taiwan policy with Beijing, but if a rebuke to Taiwan about unilateral efforts to assert independence is delivered only privately, Washington should inform Beijing of that admonition through diplomatic channels so that American assurances remain credible.
美國官員還應努力確保台灣不會破壞現狀。在蔡英文的領導下，台灣開始加強防禦，這是值得稱讚的，但她的政府也巧妙地避免了推動台灣獨立的倡議。這與她的民進黨前任總統陳水扁不同，陳水扁曾在2008年舉行公投，要求以台灣而非中華民國的名義加入聯合國，這被北京和華盛頓理所當然地解讀為推動獨立的伎倆。由於聯合國是一個國際機構，國家地位是加入聯合國的必要條件，因此以台灣而非中華民國的名義申請加入聯合國將確保台灣島的完全主權分離。如果未來的台灣政府或主要政治人物有意推動改變現狀，美國官員應私下、公開或同時表達關切。美國絕不應與北京協調其台灣政策，但如果只是私下斥責台灣單方面主張獨立的努力，華盛頓應通過外交管道向北京通報這一警告，以便美國的承諾保持可信度。

The United States could be more transparent about the parameters of its “unofficial relationship” with Taipei, including self-imposed limits on visits to Taiwan by the U.S. president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. Taiwan’s president and vice president have long been permitted to make transit visits through the United States en route to other countries, but they do not visit Washington. Such transits are private, unofficial, and arranged for the “safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity of the traveler,” according to the U.S. State Department. As such, these transits should not be occasions for large-scale, public, politically charged events. Following this precedent and acting consistently will make more believable the U.S. position that the United States is not treating Taiwan as it would a sovereign, independent state.
美國在與台北的「非官方關係」來往可以更加透明，包括對美國總統、副總統、國務卿和國防部長訪問台灣的自我限制。長期以來，台灣總統和副總統一直獲准在前往其他國家的途中過境美國，但他們不會訪問華盛頓。根據美國國務院的說法，這種過境是私人的、非官方的，是為了「旅行者的安全、舒適、便利和尊嚴」而安排的。因此，這些過境不應成為大規模、公開和政治性活動的場合。遵循這一先例並始終如一地採取行動將使美國的立場更加可信，即美國沒有像對待一個主權獨立國家那樣對待台灣。

U.S. officials, including members of Congress, should refrain from making statements that are inconsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. Resolutions calling for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state or provide an unconditional defense commitment ironically weaken deterrence by suggesting Washington intends to restore the alliance with Taipei that it abrogated in 1979. Legislation should focus on helping Taiwan defend itself and on bolstering U.S. military capabilities in East Asia in ways that are consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, while avoiding symbolic actions that do nothing to strengthen Taiwan or U.S. forces but could undermine the credibility of U.S. assurances to China.
包括國會議員在內的美國官員應避免發表不符合《台灣關係法》的言論。要求美國承認台灣為獨立主權國家或提供無條件防衛承諾的決議具有諷刺意味，它暗示華盛頓打算恢復1979年廢除的與台北的同盟關係，從而削弱了威懾力。立法的重點應該是幫助台灣自衛，並以符合《台灣關係法》的方式加強美國在東亞的軍事實力，同時避免採取象徵性行動，因為這些行動對加強台灣或美軍毫無幫助，卻可能破壞美國對中國保證的可信度。

Just as the executive branch does not send the holders of the top four positions in the U.S. government to Taiwan, similarly, as a matter of policy, Congress should not send to Taiwan the president of the Senate (who is also the vice president of the United States), the Senate president pro tempore, or the Speaker of the House. There are sufficient informal channels for these officials to give and receive messages from Taiwan and to support Taiwan without providing a convenient occasion for Beijing to ratchet up military pressure while blaming Washington and Taipei for sparking tensions. Such expressions of U.S. support for Taiwan are counterproductive as they only make the island less secure.
正如行政部門不會派遣美國政府最高四個職位的負責人前往台灣，同樣，作為一項政策，國會也不應派遣參議院議長（同時也是美國副總統）、參議院臨時議長或眾議院議長前往台灣。這些官員有足夠的非正式管道來傳遞和接收來自台灣的資訊並支持台灣，而不會為北京提供一個方便的藉口來給台灣加大軍事壓力，並同時指責華盛頓和台北刺激了緊張局勢。美國表達對台灣的支持只會適得其反，因為這只會讓台灣更加不安全。

TRUE DETERRENCE 真正的威懾

Some policymakers and analysts make the mistake of conflating assurances with appeasement or outright capitulation. This is wrong-headed. Alongside credible threats, credible assurances are an integral part of deterrence. Given the dramatic ongoing modernization of the Chinese military and China’s increasing assertiveness, the United States needs to strengthen its military posture in East Asia and assist in improving Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and helping the island withstand a potential blockade. The United States will need cooperation from regional allies to make necessary adjustments in its military posture. But failure to provide assurances to Beijing about the purpose of such adjustments will reduce the likelihood of allied cooperation—and make China harder to deter.
一些政策制定者和分析人士犯了將保證與綏靖或徹底投降混為一談的錯誤，這是錯誤的想法。除了可信的威脅之外，可信的承諾也是威懾的組成部分。鑑於中國軍隊正在進行的急劇現代化和中國日益強硬的態度，美國需要加強其在東亞的軍事態勢，並協助提高台灣的防禦能力，幫助台灣抵禦潛在的封鎖。美國需要亞太地區盟國的合作來對其軍事態勢進行必要的調整。但是，如果美國不向北京保證這種調整的目的（不是為了給海峽局勢升溫），就會降低與其他盟國合作的可能性，也會使中國更難受到威懾。

Many might argue that assurances would signal weakness and invite Chinese aggression. On the contrary, these assurances would help strengthen a deterrence strategy that includes reinforcing the U.S. military presence in East Asia and hardening Taiwan’s defense. It is precisely because tough measures are needed that it is imperative that Washington and Taipei accompany them with productive diplomatic ones, assuring Beijing that it will not be punished if it forgoes the use of force.
許多人可能會說，這種承諾只會發出軟弱的訊號，並最後招致中國的侵略。恰恰相反，這些保證將有助於加強威懾戰略，包括強化美國在東亞的軍事態勢和加強台灣的防禦。正因為需要採取強硬措施，華盛頓和台北必須同時採取富有成效的外交措施，向中國政府保證他們放棄使用武力將不會因此受到懲罰。

BONNIE S. GLASER is Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
葛來儀是智庫“德國馬歇爾基金會”亞洲計畫主任。
JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University, a Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis, and a former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff.
白潔曦是康奈爾大學政治學教授、亞洲協會政策研究所中國分析中心高級研究員，曾任美國國務院政策規劃參謀。
THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN is James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a Senior Adviser at the U.S. State Department’s China Coordination Office. The views expressed here are his own.
柯慶生是哥倫比亞大學國際與公共事務學院教授，美國國務院中國協調辦公室高級顧問。

本文僅代表其個人觀點。